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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - WAIVED AS DEFENSE TO
COUNTER CLAIM BY SOVEREIGN FILING SUIT
The United States brought action for damages to a government vehicle.
The defendant counterclaimed for damages arising from the same collision.
Held, although an independent action by the defendant was barred by
limitations, 1 the government waived its defense by bringing the action after
the two year period. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348
(D.D.C. 1952).
In the absence of statutory consent, an original action cannot be
brought against the United States.? However, a counterclaim - if it be in
the nature of a recoupment 8 - may be asserted against the United States
to reduce or defeat recovery. 4 In admiralty, this rile has been extended to
include an affirmative judgment.5 In civil cases, the Supreme Court has
concluded that consent is necessary for an affirmative judgment against
the United States.0
Although there is a conflict as to whether statutes waiving sovereign
immunity should be liberally 7 or strictly8 construed, it seems apparent that
the courts should not attempt to circumvent the express provisions of the
statute. The limitations accompanying a waiver of sovereign immunity are
considered conditions precedent to the court's jurisdiction0 and these
cannot be waived by the unauthorized acts of the sovereign's agents.' 0
It has generally been held that the defense of recoupment exists so
long as the plaintiff's cause of action exists and may be asserted, though
the claim as an independent cause of action is barred by the statute of
1. 62 STAT. 971 (1948) as amended, 63 STAT. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)(Supp. 1951) ("A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless
action is begun within two years after such claim accrues... )
2. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet.
436 (U.S. 1834); Pass v. McCrath, 192 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 910 (1952).
3. Recoupment is any claim or demand the defendant may have against the
plaintiff which grows out of the very same transaction which furnishes the plaintiff's
cause of action. See Note, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 263 (1953).
4. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1934); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141
F.2d 864 (3rd Cir. 1944).
5. United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924).
6. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
7. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. '543 (1951) (Federal Torts Claim
Act should be liberally construed). See Anderson v. John L. Hayes Const. Co., 153 N.E.
28, 30 (1926) (where Justice Cardozo says "the exemption of the sovereign from suit
involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its
rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been announced.").
8. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States v. Michel, 282
U.S. 656 (1931).
9. Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887); Roskos v. United States, 130 F.2d
751 (3rd Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 696 (1943); Morgan v. United States,
115 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
10. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. U. S. Fidelity
Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); United States v. Fitch, 185 F.2d 471 (1950).
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limitations." It may be used as a shield to prevent recovery, but not as a
sword to accomplish recovery. 12
In liberally construing the Federal Torts Claim Act the court in the
noted case has maintained that the United States, by bringing such an
action, submitted itself "to the jurisdiction of the Court for the determina-
tion of all issues that might arise from the accident. .. ."I' Since Congress
has expressly provided for a two year limitation period, it appears that the
court is going beyond the authority created by Congress under the veil of
"liberal interpretation". However, the primary concern of limitation statutes
is one of fairness to a defendant.14 He should not be called upon to defend
a "stale" claim after the evidence has disappeared. In the instant case, the
reason for the rule is not present, Therefore, the conclusion appears sound.
Alan R. Lorber.
TAXATION - CONSTITUTIONALITY OFCLIFFORD REGULATIONS
Petitioner contended that, by authority of one of the Clifford Regula-
tions, the income of a charitable inter-vivos trust was taxable to the
respondent-grantor who had retained a reversionary interest in the corpus,
alleged by petitioner to take effect within ten years from the date of transfer
of the corpus. Held, the trust was of ten years duration. However, a regu-
lation which creates a conclusive presumption that the income is the
settlor's, based solely on the trust duration without regard to who actually
derives the economic benefits, is void as it is arbitrary, unreasonable and
violative of the Fifth Amendment. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Clark, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2421 (7th Cir. March 3, 1933).
Under the Treasury Department's Clifford Regulations,' when the
grantor of a living trust retains a reversionary interest, to take effect within
ten years of the date of transfer, the income received by the beneficiary is
taxable to the grantor, even though by the terms of the instrument he
divests himself of all control over the income, and even though it be used
for general charitable trust purposes.2 The theory is that by virtue of the
short duration of the trust term, the grantor does not part with all of the
11. E.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1934); Beekner v. Katufman, 145 Fla.
152, 198 So. 794 (1940); Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459, 131 So. 324 (1930).
12. Sullivan v. Hoover, 6 F.R.D. 513 (D.D.C. 1947).
13. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D.D.C, 1952).
1-1. Note, 63 1-AIv. L. RpEv. 1177 (1950).
1. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(c) (1), as added by T.D. 5488, Dec. 29,
1945, amended by T.D. 5567, June 30, 1947.
2. In the instant case there were no controls retained by the grantor and the
transfer was irrevocable for the stated tern.
